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Article: Tacit collusion, cost asymmetries, and mergers.
- Article from:
- RAND Journal of Economics
- Article date:
- March 22, 2005
- Author:
CopyrightCOPYRIGHT 2005 Rand, Journal of Economics. This material is published under license from the publisher through the Gale Group, Farmington Hills, Michigan. All inquiries regarding rights should be directed to the Gale Group. (Hide copyright information)
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This article contributes to the analysis of tacit collusion in quantity-setting supergames involving cost-asymmetric firms. Asymmetry is dealt with by assuming that firms have a different share of a specific asset that affects marginal costs. The model extends optimal punishment schemes in the style of Abreu (1986, 1988) and provides conditions for industrywide collusion to be enforced. From the analysis of the impact of asset transfers on the sustainability of tacit collusion, merger policy implications can be drawn. In particular, I show that if the merger induces an increase in the inequality of asset holdings, this will hinder collusion.
1. Introduction
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