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Article: Investments and network competition.
- Article from:
- RAND Journal of Economics
- Article date:
- June 22, 2005
- Author:
CopyrightCOPYRIGHT 2005 Rand, Journal of Economics. This material is published under license from the publisher through the Gale Group, Farmington Hills, Michigan. All inquiries regarding rights should be directed to the Gale Group. (Hide copyright information)
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We analyze the impact of two-way access charges on the incentives to invest in networks with different levels of quality. When quality has an impact on all calls initiated by customers (destined both on-net and off-net), we obtain a result of "tacit collusion" even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing. Firms tend to underinvest in quality, and this is exacerbated if they can negotiate reciprocal termination charges above cost. When the quality of off-net calls depends on the interaction between the quality of the two networks, no network has an incentive to jump ahead of its rival by investing more.
1. Introduction
* In this article we address the ...