Druze and Jews in the war of 1948. (Israel-Arab War of 1948-49)

The relations between the Palestinian Druze and the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) commenced after the riots of 1929. They consolidated during the Palestinian rebellion in 1936-39 and the early years of the Second World War. Embracing Jabal Druze, they were part of the Jewish Agency's attempts at cultivating contacts with Middle Eastern minority groups. This policy ventured to balance Arab hostility through a friendly 'minorities block', but these groups were rivals and too weak to meet the Agency's expectations.(1)

The Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine calmed down after 1942. Simultaneously, frictions between the Yishuv and the Palestine Government increased. Under the new circumstances the ties loosened, losing much of their previous significance for both partners. The Druze's position in an Arab-Jewish confrontation in Palestine again bothered the Yishuv when this contingency reappeared after the Second World War. The Druze, too, exerted themselves on this issue because of their equivocal experience with both Jews and Arabs during the disturbances and ever since.

The SHAI's (the Haganah's intelligence service) officers in Haifa and in Galilee, Gyora Zeid, Amnon Yanai and Tuvia Lishansky, were in charge of local contacts with the Druze. Confident of their eventual fruits if another Arab-Jewish trial of force were to take place, they persisted with cultivating the bond. Elias Sasson and Yaacov Shimoni of the Arab Section of the Jewish Agency's political department, occasionally met with two Druze senior contacts, sheikh Labib Abu Ruqun of Isfiya and sheikh Saleh Hneifes of Shafa'amr. In these meetings they received a comprehensive sketch of developments within the community in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Gradually, Hneifes attracted sheikh Jaber Mu'adi of Yarka, a prominent Druze dignitary in the western Galilee, to the Jewish side.

The Druze disposition varied according to their proximity to Jewish centres. Mixed Arab-Druze villages, where old intercommunal conflicts erupted now and then, were more favourably disposed to the Jews. Hamlets neighbouring on the Jewish areas followed them, while those in the heart of Arab territories were more careful and reserved.

Early in 1946 the anxiety in Palestine grew. The country expected the Anglo-American Committee's arrival and subsequently a determination of its fate, the Druze being no exception. Upon Jaber Mu'adi's initiative, a group of notables assembled in Haifa and decided that the community should cease to depend on the Muslims. Instead, it should tighten its bond with the Jewish national institutions. The assembly appointed Mu'adi as a liaison with the Jews.

A week later sheikh Nimr al-Khatib, chief of the Muslim Brethren in Haifa, summoned Druze elders of the Carmel villages and Shafa'amr. He condemned their relations with the Jews and admonished them to stop selling their land. Al-Khatib particularly denounced Abu Ruqun and Hneifes, showing their pictures in the company of Jewish land traders.(2)

The Jewish Agency's Arab Section, too, increased its pressure on Abu Ruqun and Hneifes. Sasson and Shimoni felt that 'they do not render services commensurate with the payment they get from us'. Shimoni prevailed on the two sheikhs to diffuse the idea of 'sympathetic [to the Jews] Druze neutrality' and to establish a covert association for its promotion.(3)

Both sheikhs toured the Druze villages to find out what the community's leaders thought of such an agreement. They reported that the dignitaries welcomed the idea and proposed to summon the elders for a conference. This might be an appropriate opportunity for Sasson to raise the issue of Jewish-Druze alliance. This reply was non-committal, conveying what the messengers supposed to be expected from them. There is no evidence that the meeting ever took place, and even if it did, it yielded no results. Sasson did not cherish hopes in his agents' capacity to bring their brethren over to the Jewish side. He was aware of the opposite Arab pressures aimed at the same purpose: to secure Druze loyalty in a future encounter. The Arab Section was yet incapbale of neutralizing these exigencies.(4)

Contrary to the situation in 1936-39, the Jewish Agency could not attain in 1946-47 the support of the Jabal's leadership. Sultan al-Atrash was conspiring with King Abdullah of Transjordan for the Jabal's annexation to his kingdom. For Abdullah this might have been a first step towards accomplishing his 'Greater Syria' plan. The Arab Section knew it and abstained from any interference. In those years it embarked on a separate understanding with the King concerning another component of his scheme, the merger of Palestine's Arab part with Transjordan.(5) Because of its close relations with the Maronites and the traditional Christian-Druze rivalry, the Jewish Agency also lacked connections with the leading Druze families in Lebanon. An attempt to establish contacts with the Lebanese Druze had been made in 1944, but was unsuccessful.(6)

Pressures on the Druze intensified after the publication of the Anglo-American Committee's report. The Arabs demanded a declaration of loyalty to their cause, prevailing on Hneifes to pay tribute to Jamil Husayni, the new chairman of the Arab Higher Committee. Hneifes was non-committal, excusing himself that he had to consult with his colleagues.(7) Simultaneously, the competing paramilitary organizations, the Najada and the Futuwwa, respectively urged Druze youth to join their ranks. The dignitaries, however, were indifferent to the rivalries between the Palestinian Arab militia organizations.(8) Several notables even suggested the formation of an independent Druze militia, but their affiliation to the Jews provoked antagonism and the idea did not materialize.(9)

The Muslim Brethren in Haifa led the harassment of the Druze. Early in 1947 they intimidated Abu Ruqun and Hneifes, demanding to investigate their involvement in land transactions with the Jews. The Palestinian Druze recounted the threats to Sultan al-Atrash, who dispatched a mission to Haifa. His delegates sided with their co-religionists and admonished the Muslim leaders to stop bullying them.(10) Nimr al-Khatib then substituted threats with persuasion. He visited Druze villages, preached to their inhabitants and made them swear to abstain from selling their land. His efforts were in vain, and the Druze business connections with the Jewish National Fund continued as before.(11)

Frictions between Druze and Arabs multiplied during 1947. The SHAI watched these quarrels, counting on utilizing them eventually for driving a wedge between the rival villages and expanding it to the entire community. The Palestinian Druze position was likely to affect their Syrian and Lebanese brethren's stance in a future Jewish-Arab war. Attempts at mobilizing Druze support in 1936-39 were well known. Hundreds of Druze were serving in the Syrian army and might retire to join the fighting in Palestine. Druze officers of the Syrian army who visited Palestine declared that in case of an Arab-Jewish war they would act upon the Druze leadership's instructions. Sultan's attitude was still vague. The SHAI learned of his alleged intention to summon an assembly to urge the elders to collect funds and to propagate the cause of the Palestine Arabs. Although this might have been only a cover up of his friendly disposition towards the Jews in the past, it sounded alarming.(12)

The Arab Section therefore displayed a growing interest in the Syrian and Lebanese Druze's relations among themselves and with their respective governments. It dispatched its agent Ahmad al-Khalil, a judge in Haifa, to report on their development. He met with Druze leaders in both countries and conveyed his impressions to his operator: 'The situation in Jabal Druze is very serious, the relations with the Syrian government have deteriorated and there is no hope for a quick settlement.'(13) Soon afterwards, in November 1947, riots broke out in the Jabal between the Tarashan - the partisans of the al-Atrash family - and their opponents of Al-Lajnah Sha'biya. The death toll rose to 14 people, the adversaries captured many hostages and Sultan blamed the Syrian government for stirring the disturbances.(14)

After the Arab League's conference at Aley in October 1947, Druze dignitaries joined with Palestinian notables of all creeds who set on pilgrimage to the Mufti in Lebanon. Naguib Manzur, the Mukhtar of Isfiya, paid a visit to Hajj Amin, listened patiently to his exigencies and went to the Jabal to consult with its leaders. They advised him that the Palestinian Druze should negotiate with the Jews and find out their position. They should also ask for their help in counteracting Arab propaganda and demands, such as the recruitment of Druze youngsters to their ranks.(15)

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in December 1947 the divisions among the Druze in Palestine and in the adjacent countries continued. The best solution seemed to be to stay aloof and await developments. Notables from Syria and Lebanon who visited the Druze villages cautioned an absolute neutrality towards the Arab-Jewish conflict.(16)

Among the visitors was Kemal Qanj, a Druze delegate to the Syrian parliament and son of sheikh As'ad of Majdal Shams, at the bottom of Mount Hermon. Through Naguib Manzur he contacted Tuvia Arazi, the Arab Section's representative in Haifa. Qanj offered to provide information on the Palestinian irregulars in the manner of the Druze-Jewish co-operation in the past. Arazi summoned Ezra Danin, the political department's expert on Arab affairs, to Haifa. Danin had some previous experience with sheikh As'ad, and therefore recommended turning down tactfully his son's proposal pending its thorough study. By contrast, Qanj junior favourably impressed Arazi who advised his superiors to hire his services and undertake the expenses.(17)

The political department satisfied itself at this stage with prevention. Its main concern was to frustrate any Druze alignment with the Arab gangs, and this had preference to mobilizing their active support. …

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