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Article: Noncooperative foundations for the Kalai-Smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures.
- Article from:
- Atlantic Economic Journal
- Article date:
- December 1, 1997
- Author:
CopyrightCOPYRIGHT 1997 Atlantic Economic Society. This material is published under license from the publisher through the Gale Group, Farmington Hills, Michigan. All inquiries regarding rights should be directed to the Gale Group. (Hide copyright information)
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Introduction
Albers and Albers [1983, p. 274] noted that bargaining proposals "frequently have a prominence about 10 percent of the [pie] and the range is between 5 percent and 25 percent." That is, as van Damme et al. [1990, p. 200] put it, "[i]f bargaining is about $1 million, the prominence level...is probably not smaller than $500. If the proposer asks for $501,297.34, it is not excluded that the responder concludes that the proposer is insane and we do not know how the bargaining would continue in this case."
If the pie is symmetric as in van Damme et al. [1990],(1) then players can agree to have a common prominence level. If, however, the pie is such ...