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Article: Anonymity deters collusion in hard-close auctions: experimental evidence.(RESEARCH ARTICLE)(Report)
- Article from:
- New Zealand Economic Papers
- Article date:
- August 1, 2009
- Author:
CopyrightCOPYRIGHT 2009 New Zealand Association of Economists. This material is published under license from the publisher through the Gale Group, Farmington Hills, Michigan. All inquiries regarding rights should be directed to the Gale Group. (Hide copyright information)
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1. Introduction
Auction market design has become a popular topic in theoretical and experimental economics. The growing interest in the field is due to the increased significance of auction mechanism design in empirical government procurement, privatization programs and internet markets. To organize, for example, markets for spectrum licenses, gas leases or electricity the auction design must be carefully chosen to prevent undesired outcomes, (1) since these markets usually involve the sale of multiple units (worth several millions of dollars) to a small number of potential bidders. It has been argued that one of the most important challenges to the auction ...
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