Caribbean Narcotics Trafficking: What Is to Be Done?

Introduction

At the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalization catapulted domestic crime across national boundaries into the transnational domain. Transnational crime has since mutated into a complex matrix of criminal activities. (1) Narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and illegal migration are integral components of extensive criminal networks that undermine the democratic stability, economic development and social well being of nations. (2) National and international response to non-traditional threats are further complicated by a myriad of security issues territorial disputes, economic decline, and natural and man made disasters that limit available resources.

Today, the narcotics trade is not only a multi-billion dollar industry, but it is also the center of gravity for many of the ills associated with trans-national crime. (3) In the western hemisphere, trade routes for narcotics trafficking vacillate between the transit zones of Central America and the Caribbean. (4) Known as the the third border of the United States, the tiny islands of the Caribbean lie between the world's leading producer, and the world's leading consumer of cocaine and marijuana South America and the United States, respectively. (5) Former U.S. Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, described the ghastly effects of the narcotics trade as a "shared agony throughout this hemisphere." (6)

The geographic outlay of the Caribbean region adds to the complexities of counter-drug measures within the region. These tropical islands are in proximity to major sea lines of communication - the Panama Canal and Caribbean Sea areas. They extend from the Trinidad and Tobago Islands in the south (near the northern Venezuelan coastline) to the Bahama Islands in the north (approximately fifty miles off the U.S. east coast). The proximity of the Caribbean chain of islands to the major sea lines of communication, and its vast coastlines and territorial seas make this region a natural transit route for narcotics trafficking into the United States and Europe.

In recent years, limited resources of Caribbean governments have compelled them to join the United States in a cooperative posture toward combating drug trafficking. (7) Although cooperative security has given way to a host of bilateral and multilateral frameworks, peripheral measures such as joint training and asset acquisition will remain ineffective unless comprehensively reinforced by political will, economic viability, and social stability at the national, multilateral and multinational levels. (8)

These strategic factors political will, economic viability and social stability are major components of national power. Consequently, they must be consistently harnessed and fed into the cooperative equation, if efforts to safeguard the region against narcotics trafficking, and other elements of trans-national crime are to be effective. (9)

Political Will

National sovereignty, regional cooperation, and institutional integrity are vital subsets of political will. Issues regarding them require decisive resolution by government officials and policy makers to strengthen the process of cooperative security between nations.

The political, economic and social crises posed by drug smuggling require both U.S. and Caribbean policy makers to develop means of alleviating understandable fears concerning loss of sovereignty. In the past, interdiction efforts made by the U.S. were conducted within Caribbean territories without regard for the sovereignty and independent legal systems of those countries. (10) This unilateral approach generated much skepticism among Caribbean nations. (11) Upon introduction by the U.S., Caribbean nations interpreted the concept of collective security as an American ploy to undermine their sovereignty. (12) The ensuing political fallout created a collaborative stalemate between the U.S. and its Caribbean neighbors.

In addition to this, U.S.-led sanctions against Cuba following the overthrow of its government in 1959 by communist insurgents under Fidel Castro resulted in Cuba's isolation from regional affairs. Hence, a vital piece of the cooperative puzzle was missing from the Caribbean security framework.

Now that the Cold War is over, the United States no longer has a distinct security strategy for the region and sanctions against Cuba remain in effect. (13) The resultant absence of nationally and regionally coordinated strategies between local public agencies as well as national governments have stifled cooperative engagement. A classic example was evidenced in attempts made by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to better coordinate agency activities within the United States. The ONDCP's endeavours to unite U.S. law enforcement services were resisted by respective agencies resulting in continued deficiencies and ineffectiveness in counter-drug measures. (14) A similar occurrence was noted at the regional level during U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit with Caribbean foreign ministers in 1998. At the meeting, the Secretary of State was greeted at the negotiating table by Caribbean leaders, whose individual agendas were focused on national rather than regional interests. (15) Co nsequently, efforts to cement regional security ties were diluted by independent thinking. (16)

Lack of regional collaboration is not solely responsible for the slow tempo experienced in the process of cooperative security. …

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